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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Marla G. Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the most significant published criminal
law decisions of Virginia appellate courts through June 10, 2004.1
The article examines several decisions from the Supreme Court of
the United States that will have a major impact on Virginia law.
The article also reviews the most important legislative enact-
ments of the Virginia General Assembly in the area of criminal
law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. First Amendment
In the latest chapter of this protracted litigation, the Supreme
Court of Virginia, in Commonwealth v. Hicks,2 affirmed the de-
* Chief, Special Prosecutions Section, Office of the Attorney General, Common-
wealth of Virginia. B.A., 1980, Gettysburg College; J.D., 1983, University of Richmond
School of Law.
** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Office of the Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1994, University of Virginia, with high distinc-
tion; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
1. The reader should be aware that a number of key decisions from the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia are not discussed here because the Supreme Court of Virginia has agreed
to review them. See Carter v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 681, 695-96, 594 S.E.2d 284,
292 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that actual ability to inflict harm is not required for a crimi-
nal assault conviction); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 537, 537, 592 S.E.2d 789, 789
(Ct. App. 2004) (withdrawing an earlier panel decision regarding propriety of search under
Virginia Code section 19.2-74 and affirming the defendant's conviction); Nelson v. Com-
monwealth, 41 Va. App. 716, 729, 735, 589 S.E.2d 23, 29, 32 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
the trial court did not err in (1) refusing the defendant access to subpoenaed documents
and (2) failing to excuse a juror during the trial); Peyton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App.
356, 360, 585 S.E.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a suspended sentence is prop-
erly revoked when the defendant is unable to complete a detention center program).
2. 267 Va. 573, 596 S.E.2d 74 (2004).
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fendant's conviction for trespassing. In 2003, the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the Supreme Court of Virginia on
the technical issue of the standard of review for facial over-
breadth challenges under the First Amendment.' The Court then
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia for a deter-
mination concerning any other bases for challenging the convic-
tion.'
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia first declined to ex-
amine whether the Housing Authority's policy banning Hicks
from the property could improperly apply to other persons in dif-
ferent circumstances because Hicks's conduct clearly fell within
the prohibitions of the policy.6 Second, the court found inapt
Hicks's comparison of the trespass policy at issue to an anti-
loitering criminal statute found unconstitutional in Chicago v.
Morales.7 Finally, the court held that the policy did not violate
Hicks's right to have an intimate association with his family un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.' At trial, Hicks contended he was bringing diapers to his
child.9 The court noted that Hicks had not established the exis-
tence of any intimate relationship between himself and the child
or his mother, and, moreover, the right to such associations is not
unlimited.1 ° Furthermore, "Hicks does not have the constitutional
right to visit either his mother or his child at the Housing Author-
ity's private property where he has been barred because of his
prior criminal conduct." 11
In another case remanded from the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Elliott v. Com-
monwealth," affirmed the defendants' convictions under the
3. Id. at 585, 596 S.E.2d at 81.
4. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-24 (2003) (plurality opinion). For further
discussion of this case, see Marla G. Decker & Stephen R. McCullough, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Criminal Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 87, 114 (2003).
5. Id. at 124.
6. See Hicks, 267 Va. at 581, 596 S.E.2d at 78.
7. Id. at 582-83, 596 S.E.2d at 78-79 (discussing reasons why the Court's decision in
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) is inapplicable to Hicks's case).
8. Id. at 583, 596 S.E.2d at 79.
9. Id. at 585, 596 S.E.2d at 80.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 267 Va. 464, 593 S.E.2d 263 (2004).
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cross-burning statute found in Virginia Code section 18.2-423.13
The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case on
three issues: the proper interpretation of the statutory provision
which provided that burning a cross constituted prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate, whether this provision could be
severed from the statute, and the disposition of the cases against
the defendants. 14 On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia reaf-
firmed its earlier holding that the prima facie provision was un-
constitutional. 5 At Elliott's trial, however, the trial court had not
relied on this provision in its jury instructions.16 The defendants
contended "the unconstitutional prima facie evidence provision
cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute."' Under
Virginia Code section 1-17.1, statutory provisions "are severable
unless the statute specifically provides its provisions are not sev-
erable" or the provisions of the statute must operate in accord
with one another." The court held that neither exception to the
general rule applied and, therefore, the statutory provisions were
severable.' 9 The court also declared without elaboration that "Ar-
ticle I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia is coextensive with the
free speech provisions of the federal First Amendment.""
In Boyd v. County of Henrico,2' the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, examined whether a county ordinance ban-
ning public nudity violated the First Amendment.22 The County
charged two owners and an erotic dancer of the Gold City Show-
girls strip club with violating the ordinance, a misdemeanor.23 In
its examination of the changes, the court of appeals noted that
while semi-nude dancing at strip clubs benefits from "some meas-
ure" of First Amendment protection, the right "is hardly a robust
13. Id. at 476, 593 S.E.2d at 270. Jonathan O'Mara pled guilty to attempted cross-
burning and conspiracy to do so, and Richard J. Elliot was convicted of attempted cross-
burning. Id. at 467-68, 593 S.E.2d at 265; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Repl. Vol.
2004).
14. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367-68 (2003).
15. Elliot, 267 Va. at 471, 593 S.E.2d at 267.
16. Id. at 474, 593 S.E.2d at 269.
17. Id. at 471, 593 S.E.2d at 267.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
19. Elliot, 267 Va. at 471-72, 593 S.E.2d at 267-68.
20. Id. at 473-74, 593 S.E.2d at 269.
21. 42 Va. App. 495, 592 S.E.2d 768 (Ct. App. 2004).
22. Id. at 507-17, 592 S.E.2d at 774-79.
23. Id. at 504, 504 n.3, 592 S.E.2d at 772-73, 773 n.3.
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one."24 Second, the ordinance "regulates conduct-not the content
of anyone's speech," because it bans all public nudity "regardless
of whether that nudity is accompanied by expressive activity."25
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the existence of
an exemption for theatrical performances in the ordinance trans-
formed the ordinance into a content-based restriction.26 The court
found this exemption "does nothing more than ensure that the
ordinance incidentally restricts the least amount of expressive
conduct, and thus, protects the ordinance against an overbreadth
challenge."27 The ordinance was also content-neutral, the court
reasoned, because of the interest in combating the "unique secon-
dary effects associated with erotic clubs."28
Having concluded that the ordinance was content-neutral, the
court applied the following test for such laws. The ordinance is
constitutional if it:
(i) falls within "the constitutional power" of the county, (ii) furthers
an "important or substantial government interest," (iii) furthers that
interest in a manner "unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion," and (iv) imposes no greater incidental restriction on protected
speech "than is essential to the furtherance of that [sic] interest.
29
The court held that the Henrico County ordinance satisfied this
test. °
The court further held that the ordinance was not unconstitu-
tionally vague and that the County was not required to provide
the club with specific notice of the ordinance. 31 The court held
that the County had not engaged in selective prosecution and had
acted within its authority in enacting the ordinance.2 Finally, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's factual findings
24. Id. at 507-08, 592 S.E.2d at 774 (citing Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289
(2000) (plurality opinion)).
25. Id. at 509, 592 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Erie, 529 U.S. at 290).
26. Id. at 510, 592 S.E.2d at 776.
27. Id. at 512, 592 S.E.2d at 776.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 513, 592 S.E.2d at 777 (quoting Erie, 529 U.S. at 296-301).
30. Id. at 513-16, 592 S.E.2d at 777-79.
31. Id. at 517-21, 592 S.E.2d at 779-81. The court declined to speculate about
whether the ordinance could be applied to "short-shorts" or "contemporary swimwear." Id.
at 520, 592 S.E.2d at 780. The court disagreed with the appellant's contention that vague-
ness should be considered in terms of the ordinance's application to other violators. Id. at
519, 592 S.E.2d at 780.
32. Id. at 521-25, 592 S.E.2d at 781-83.
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that the club was not a theater and the performers were not en-
gaged in a theatrical performance.3
B. Fourth Amendment
The 2004 term of the Supreme Court of the United States re-
sulted in several significant Fourth Amendment cases that reaf-
firm the manner in which the Fourth Amendment has been ap-
plied in similar situations by Virginia courts.
In Illinois v. Lidster,34 a highway checkpoint was set up one
week after a hit-and-run accident and at the same location and
time of night as the accident under investigation.3 5 The Supreme
Court of the United States found that the checkpoint was reason-
able and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held
that the defendant, who, "as he approached the checkpoint,
swerved, nearly hitting one of the officers," was properly
stopped. 7 The Court further held that once the officer smelled al-
cohol on or about the defendant's person and conducted a field so-
briety test, the defendant was properly arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol.3" The Supreme Court specifically held
that its decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond39 did not gov-
ern the constitutionality of the checkpoint at issue here, which
was intended to solicit help from motorists and passengers in ob-
taining information about an unsolved recent crime. ° The Court
applied the traditional test established in Brown v. Texas,4" which
examines "the gravity of the public concerns served by the sei-
zure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public inter-
est, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty,"42
to conclude that the checkpoint was wholly reasonable and met
constitutional standards.
33. Id. at 525-26, 592 S.E.2d at 783.
34. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
35. Id. at 888.
36. Id. at 891.
37. Id. at 888, 891.
38. See id.
39. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
40. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888-89.
41. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
42. Id. at 51.
43. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890-91.
2004]
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The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Banks" in-
volved a question that has plagued Virginia's courts and criminal
law practitioners for a very long time. With this decision, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has provided guidance on the
length of time considered "reasonable" for the waiting period be-
fore police may enter a private residence in a "knock and an-
nounce" execution of a search warrant.45 Banks addresses the
situation wherein the risk of losing evidence-in this case, co-
caine-arose shortly after the police knocked on a door and an-
nounced their presence with a warrant.46 The Court ruled that af-
ter waiting "15 or 20 seconds without a response, police could
fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they [waited] any
longer" before entering the residence.47 The Court opined that the
important fact is not how long it takes for the individual inside to
get to the door, but how long it takes to destroy the evidence.'
While each case will depend upon its particular facts, in this case,
the Court found that the police entry after a fifteen- to twenty-
second waiting period was proper.49
Another Fourth Amendment decision, Maryland v. Pringle,°
arguably alters the manner in which some state courts have
viewed occupants' presence in a car with drugs. In Pringle, a po-
lice officer stopped a car for speeding." There were three occu-
pants in the car.5 2 The officer requested the driver's license and
registration53 and when the driver opened the glove compartment
to retrieve the registration, the officer saw a large wad of
money.54 The officer took the license and registration back to the
police car and ran a records check on the driver's license, finding
no violations.55 The officer returned to the car, gave the driver an
oral warning, and then asked if he could search the car; the
44. 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).
45. Id. at 523-24.
46. Id. at 526.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 527.
49. Id.
50. 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
51. Id. at 798.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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driver gave his consent to a search.56 The officer found five bag-
gies of cocaine behind the backseat armrest and all three occu-
pants were arrested for possession of cocaine." Subsequently,
Pringle admitted that the drugs belonged to him alone." The Su-
preme Court found that
it [is] an entirely reasonable inference.., that any or all three of the
occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control
over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of posses-
sion of cocaine, either solely or jointly [with others in the vehicle] .59
The final Supreme Court case relating to the Fourth Amend-
ment is one which originated in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit. In Thornton v. United States,6 ° the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the search of an
automobile subsequent to the custodial arrest of an occupant of
that vehicle, as approved in New York v. Belton,6 extends to
situations where the officer first comes into contact with the ar-
restee when the arrestee is outside the vehicle.62 The Court held
that "Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact
until the person arrested has left the vehicle."63 Consequently, a
contemporaneous search of the vehicle is proper.64 In short, the
Court held that Belton allows police to search a car's passenger
compartment incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both an ac-
tual occupant or "recent" occupant of the car.65 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted:
[Wihile an arrestee's status as a "recent occupant" may turn on his
temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest
and search, it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or
outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact
with him.
66
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 800-01.
60. 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
61. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
62. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2129.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2132.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2131-32.
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This interpretation of Belton is consistent with previous Virginia
decisions.67
In addition to Supreme Court cases, Virginia state courts have
ruled on a number of important Fourth Amendment cases during
the past year.
An important case from the Supreme Court of Virginia, revers-
ing a decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, is Jackson v.
Commonwealth.6" Jackson dealt with information provided to the
police by an unidentified source.69 A police officer received a dis-
patched call, based on a tip from an anonymous caller.7 ° The offi-
cer was told that about three African-American males in a car,
which was described by make and color and was reported as be-
ing at a specific intersection.7' The complainant told the dis-
patcher that the three men had been disorderly, and that one of
them had brandished a firearm.72 The officer assigned to the call
approached the specified intersection, observed that the car was
occupied by three African-American males, and executed a traffic
stop.73 The defendant, a passenger, had his hands folded across
his stomach." Another officer who arrived on the scene ordered
the defendant out of the car and a gun was removed from the
waistband of defendant's pants.75 He was searched and rocks of
cocaine were found in his pants pocket.76
The defendant moved to suppress based on the claim that the
police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity prior to the stop, but the motion was denied.77 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia affirmed the defendant's conviction for the
drug and firearms offenses.7" The Supreme Court of Virginia,
however, following Florida v. J.L., reversed the convictions.0
67. See, e.g., Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 137 (1999).
68. 267 Va. 666, 594 S.E.2d 595 (2004).
69. Id. at 669, 594 S.E.2d at 596.
70. Id. at 670, 594 S.E.2d at 597.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 671, 594 S.E.2d at 597.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 670, 594 S.E.2d at 596.
78. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 597; see Jackson v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 624, 576 S.E.2d
206 (Ct. App. 2003).
79. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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The court held that "[ulnder the totality of the circumstances,...
the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify
the investigatory stop of the vehicle," which meant "the stop was
illegal as well as the subsequent search of Jackson's person."81
In the area of what constitutes a lawful "arrest," a case worthy
of note is Hudson v. Commonwealth. 2 In Hudson, the defendant
was driving erratically and was detained by an off-duty, uni-
formed police officer who was outside of his jurisdictional bound-
ary." The officer detained Hudson until another officer, within
proper jurisdiction, arrived. 4 The original officer did not collect
any evidence, but merely held the defendant.8 5 Subsequently, the
second officer asked Hudson to submit to a breath test for alcohol,
but Hudson repeatedly failed to provide a valid sample. 6 He was
ultimately convicted for an "unreasonable refusal to submit to a
blood or breath test" in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-
268.3.7 The Court of Appeals of Virginia initially reversed, but
the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the conviction, finding that
the first officer, acting outside his jurisdiction, did not attempt to
gather any evidence and merely made a valid citizen's arrest for a
breach of the peace. 8
In Jarrett v. Commonwealth, 9 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
was faced with the question of whether a computer hacker, who
had previously provided credible information to authorities and
provided information to the police which aided in the apprehen-
sion of this defendant, was acting as a government agent when he
conducted his search of the defendant's computer. 90 The computer
hacker, who was located in Turkey, provided the police with in-
formation about the defendant which led to his convictions for
"sodomy, object sexual penetration, and aggravated sexual bat-
tery."9 The court of appeals found that the computer hacker,
80. Jackson, 267 Va. at 681, 594 S.E.2d at 603.
81. Id. at 681, 594 S.E.2d at 603.
82. 266 Va. 371, 585 S.E.2d 583 (2003).
83. Id. at 373, 585 S.E.2d at 584.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
88. Hudson, 266 Va. at 382-83, 585 S.E.2d at 590.
89. 42 Va. App. 702, 594 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 2004).
90. Id. at 705, 594 S.E.2d at 297.
91. Id. at 702, 709-11, 594 S.E.2d at 299.
2004]
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identified as "Unknown user," was not acting as a government
agent when he obtained the incriminating information about the
defendant which he provided to the police.92 Thus, there was no
unlawful search.93 To reach this result, the court applied a two-
part test: "'(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in
the search, and (2) whether the search was conducted for the
purpose of furthering the private party's ends."'94 Additionally,
the court analyzed "whether the private party acted at the re-
quest of the government and whether the government offered a
reward."95
In Commonwealth v. Jones,96 the Supreme Court of Virginia,
reversing the court of appeals, refashioned the test being used in
Virginia with regard to application of the "inevitable discovery"
exception to the exclusionary rule.97 In Jones, the police were on
patrol at night, near a residence where there had been numerous
complaints of drug sales.9 "Officers approached the residence
[from the rear] and [saw] a group of men standing on the side-
walk in front of the [house] ." The men fled as soon as the officers
arrived. °° One of the officers aimed his flashlight at the defen-
dant and saw a gun in his hand.1 ' The officer alerted the other
officers of the danger and directed the defendant to "[get on the
ground."0 2 He then "wrestled [the defendant] to the ground and
heard [the] gun hit the pavement."0 3 Another officer retrieved the
weapon and the defendant was placed under "investigative deten-
tion," handcuffed, and searched.' 4 A substance believed to be co-
caine was found on the defendant's person and he was trans-
ported to the police station.' 5 During a routine criminal history
92. Id. at 717, 594 S.E.2d at 302.
93. See id. at 717, 594 S.E.2d at 303.
94. Id. at 713, 594 S.E.2d at 300-01 (quoting Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
459, 463-64, 418 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ct. App. 1992)).
95. Id. at 713, 594 S.E.2d at 301 (quoting Sabo v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 63, 75,
561 S.E.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 2002)).
96. 267 Va. 532, 593 S.E.2d 204 (2004).
97. Id. at 538, 593 S.E.2d at 208.
98. Id. at 534, 593 S.E.2d at 205.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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check at the station, the officer found that the defendant "had
been found guilty as a juvenile of an offense that would be a fel-
ony if committed by an adult."" 6 The defendant was charged with
a firearms offense.1 °7 After the defendant had been advised of his
rights, he admitted that the contraband on his person was co-
caine."'
In considering the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine,
the trial court held that the detention was proper, as a pat-down
for weapons would have been authorized, but a full search of the
defendant's person was not appropriate because the officer lacked
probable cause at the time of the search." 9 Nevertheless, the trial
court determined that "discovery of the drugs [on the defendant's
person] would have been inevitable" under the circumstances
and, consequently, denied the motion to suppress the cocaine."0
The trial court relied on the testimony of the officer that when-
ever a firearm is involved he would, in the ordinary course of
business, check for outstanding warrants or convictions."'
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court's deci-
sion," 2 relying on the three-part test articulated in Walls v. Com-
monwealth."3 The Walls court embraced and adopted the test
first developed in United States v. Cherry, a decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit."' The Cherry test requires the
police to be in active pursuit of an alternative line of investigation
prior to misconduct." ' Based on this test, the court of appeals
ruled that inevitable discovery was inapplicable, and the trial
court improperly admitted the evidence." 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the decision of the
court of appeals, ruling that the three-part test was not based on
Supreme Court of the United States precedent set by Nix v. Wil-
106. Id. at 535, 593 S.E.2d at 206.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 534-35, 593 S.E.2d at 206. Upon analysis, the substance turned out to be
aspirin. Id. at 535 n.3, 593 S.E.2d at 206 n.3.
109. Id. at 535, 593 S.E.2d at 206.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 536, 593 S.E.2d at 206.
113. 2 Va. App. 639, 347 S.E. 2d 175 (Ct. App. 1986).
114. 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 536, 593 S.E.2d at 207.
116. Id. at 536-37, 593 S.E.2d at 207.
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liams."7 Specifically, the court found that the third component,
requiring that, prior to the misconduct the police were actively
pursuing an alternative line of investigation, was too stringent
and would "tip the scales against the prosecution and put it in a
worse position than it would have been in had no illegality tran-
spired.""'8
According to the court, "inevitable discovery" depends on the
application of a two-part test: 1) reasonable probability that "but
for" the police misconduct the evidence would have been discov-
ered and 2) the leads making discovery inevitable were possessed
by the police at the time of the misconduct.'1 9 The supreme court
concluded that, because a preponderance of the evidence showed
that the cocaine "ultimately and inevitably would have been dis-
covered by lawful means," it was admissible and the decision of
the trial court was affirmed. 2 °
A final case worth noting for purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis is Fisher v. Commonwealth. 2' In Fisher, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that the defendant's operation of his ve-
hicle without a valid inspection sticker, under the circumstances
of the case, provided the police with lawful grounds to impound
the vehicle and conduct an inventory search pursuant to that po-
lice department's policy.'22 Contrary to the defendant's sugges-
tion, the police were neither required to determine the basis for
the vehicle's rejection after inspection, nor were they required to
ask the defendant if he wished to make alternative towing ar-
rangements before the officer enforced his department's proce-
dure with regard to impoundment of defective vehicles.123
C. Fifth Amendment
In Powell v. Commonwealth,'24 a case unusual even by the
standards of capital litigation, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
117. See id. at 538, 593 S.E.2d at 208 (applying Nix, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 538, 593 S.E.2d at 208.
120. Id. at 538, 593 S.E.2d at 208 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
121. 42 Va. App. 395, 592 S.E.2d 377 (Ct. App. 2004).
122. Id. at 403, 592 S.E.2d at 381.
123. Id. at 401, 405, 592 S.E.2d at 379, 381.
124. 267 Va. 107, 590 S.E.2d 537 (2004).
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dressed several Fifth Amendment issues. Powell was originally
convicted of the capital murder of Stacey Reed and the attempted
capital murder of Stacey's sister, Kristie Reed. 125 In his first trial,
the predicate for capital murder was that Powell raped Kristie be-
fore or during the murder of Stacey.'26 On appeal, the court found
there was no evidence that Powell had sexually assaulted Stacey
"before or during her murder" and "that the rape of Kristie did
not occur until after the murder of her sister."127 Since the Com-
monwealth had to prove the rape of Kristie occurred before or
during the murder of Stacey, the Commonwealth failed to estab-
lish the predicate for capital murder. 2 ' After the court handed
down its decision, the defendant wrote a taunting letter to the
Commonwealth's Attorney detailing his attempt to rape Stacey
before he killed her.'29 Relying on this letter, the Commonwealth
obtained a new indictment for capital murder. 3 ° The new charge
relied on Powell's attempt to rape Stacey, rather than her sister
Kristie.' 3 ' Powell was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
death. 32
On appeal, the supreme court framed the issue as one of collat-
eral estoppel, "whether the jury in Powell's first trial considered
whether Powell attempted to rape Stacey Reed and concluded
that he did not."133 In resolving the question, the court examined
the indictment in conjunction with the Commonwealth's response
to the bill of particulars.' In its response, the government
"clearly limited the prosecution of the capital murder of Sta-
cey... to proof of the rape or attempted rape of Kristie."35 The
court again relied on the bill of particulars to reject the defen-
dant's double jeopardy argument concluding:
[W]here, prior to the attachment of jeopardy, the Commonwealth
limits the prosecution of a capital murder, undifferentiated in the
125. Id. at 116, 590 S.E.2d at 543.
126. Id. at 117, 590 S.E.2d at 543.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 117-18, 590 S.E.2d at 544.
130. Id. at 118, 590 S.E.2d at 544.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 126, 590 S.E.2d at 549.
133. Id. at 131, 590 S.E.2d at 551.
134. Id. at 131, 590 S.E.2d at 552.
135. Id.
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indictment by the identity of the victim of the gradation offense, by
naming a specific victim of the gradation offense in a bill of particu-
lars, jeopardy will attach only to the capital murder charge as made
specific by the bill of particulars.
136
In J.D. v. Commonwealth,137 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether statements made by a student to an assistant
principal of his school should be suppressed because the defen-
dant did not receive any Miranda' warnings. 39 In response to
questioning by the assistant principal, the defendant admitted
his involvement in the theft of a video camera. 4 ° Citing the
"weight of authority" from other states, the court concluded the
statements should not be suppressed because the assistant prin-
cipal who questioned the defendant "was not a law enforcement
officer, nor was he acting as an agent of a law enforcement gov-
ernmental agency [and] ... did not act at the direction of the po-
lice."' Furthermore, since J.D. was not "in custody," or "other-
wise deprived of his freedom,"' the strictures of the Miranda
decision did not apply."' Finally, the court declined to extend the
exclusionary rule to such situations on the policy ground of foster-
ing an environment of cooperation in the school, stating that such
policy decisions "are more appropriately addressed to the legisla-
ture. ,,1
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Hudgins v. Common-
wealth'45 that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a reprosecution
for larceny from the person when the defendant has been previ-
ously acquitted of robbery for the same theft. 146 After examining
the elements of the two offenses, the court held that "larceny from
the person ... is a lesser-included offense of robbery."147 Because
it is a lesser-included offense, an acquittal on the greater offense
136. Id. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554.
137. 42 Va. App. 329, 591 S.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 2004). For additional discussion of this
case, see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Family and Juvenile
Law, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 241, 264 (2004).
138. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
139. J.D., 42 Va. App. at 332, 591 S.E.2d at 723.
140. Id. at 333, 591 S.E.2d at 723.
141. Id. at 336, 591 S.E.2d at 725.
142. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
143. Id. at 337, 591 S.E.2d at 725.
144. Id. at 337-38, 591 S.E.2d at 725-26.
145. 43 Va. App. 219, 597 S.E.2d 221(Ct. App. 2004).
146. Id. at 240, 597 S.E.2d at 231.
147. Id.
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precludes a prosecution on the lesser charge. 148 To the extent the
court's prior decision in Graves v. Commonwealth149 holds other-
wise, that decision was overruled. 5 °
D. Sixth Amendment
1. Confrontation Clause
The Supreme Court of the United States handed down a deci-
sion with a major impact on Virginia criminal trials. At issue in
Crawford v. Washington 5' was whether the trial court properly
admitted a statement made to the police by the defendant's
wife.' 52 The statement undermined the defendant's explanation
that he stabbed the victim in self-defense.'53 The defendant's wife
did not testify at trial because of the marital privilege.5 4 Prior to
Crawford, such statements were deemed to satisfy the Confronta-
tion Clause if they bore an "adequate indicia of reliability."' Fol-
lowing a lengthy historical analysis, the Court concluded that the
only way to ensure the reliability of "testimonial" statements is
by subjecting them to cross-examination.5 6 The Court held that
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [may be]
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. " "'
The Court left "for another day any effort to spell out a compre-
hensive definition of 'testimonial. '""'5 The opinion specifies, how-
ever, that "testimonial" certainly covers evidence of "testimony at
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial;
148. Id. at 239, 597 S.E.2d at 230.
149. 21 Va. App. 161, 462 S.E.2d 902 (Ct. App. 1995), affd on reh'g en banc, 22 Va.
App. 262, 468 S.E.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1996).
150. Hudgins, 43 Va. App. at 240, 597 S.E.2d at 231.
151. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
152. Id. at 1359.
153. Id. at 1358.
154. Id. at 1357.
155. Id. at 1359 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). Crawford explicitly
overrules Roberts. Id. at 1374. The Court said that "the Roberts test is inherently, and
therefore permanently, unpredictable." Id. at 1374 n. 10.
156. Id. at 1365.
157. Id. at 1369.
158. Id. at 1374.
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and to police interrogations."" 9 Statements that are not testimo-
nial are not affected by the Court's holding. 160
2. Juries
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed an issue of juror
bias in Brooks v. Commonwealth.'6' In Brooks, the defendant was
charged with various sex crimes against minors. 16 2 During the
trial, a juror informed the court clerk that her brother-in-law was
the victim's great uncle, but that she did not know the victim.'63
The court examined the juror, and determined, over the defen-
dant's objection, that she was impartial and should remain on the
jury. 16 On appeal, the court of appeals examined whether the
rules of consanguinity or affinity required the exclusion of the ju-
ror.' 65 First, consanguinity is defined as a '"relation by blood."'"66
The court noted the juror "was not related by blood to her sister's
husband and, by extension, she was not related by blood to the
victims or their fathers."167 Second, affinity "'is the relation of one
spouse to the other spouse's kindred." 16' The court held "the rela-
tionship at issue did not involve [the juror] and her husband's
blood relatives. Rather, it involved a relationship between her sis-
ter's husband and his blood relatives." 69 Therefore, "the relation-
ship does not fall within the definition of affinity." 7 ° The record
supported the trial court's conclusion that the juror would be im-
partial. 71 The court also concluded that allowing the juror to hear
the case would not affect the public confidence in the judicial
process.'72
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 41 Va. App. 454, 585 S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 2003).
162. Id. at 457, 585 S.E.2d at 853.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 459, 585 S.E.2d at 854.
165. Id. at 460, 585 S.E.2d at 854.
166. Id. (quoting Doyle v. Commonwealth, 100 Va. 808, 810, 40 S.E. 925, 926 (1902)).
167. Id. at 460, 585 S.E.2d at 854-55.
168. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 855 (quoting Doyle, 100 Va. at 810, 40 E.S.2d at 926).
169. Id. at 461, 585 S.E.2d at 855.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 462, 585 S.E.2d at 855.
172. Id. at 463-64, 585 S.E.2d at 856.
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In Blevins v. Commonwealth,'73 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether a juror's failure to accurately answer a ques-
tion during voir dire required a mistrial. 7 4 During voir dire, the
trial court asked the members of the venire if they "ha[d] ever
been the victim[s] of a serious offense."7 5 The members of the ve-
nire answered in the negative. 176 Following the conclusion of the
trial and the conviction of the defendant, one juror told a deputy
that she did not park in the parking garage because she had been
the victim of an armed robbery in a parking garage. 77 The deputy
brought this fact to the attention of the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, who notified defense counsel. 78 Upon the defendant's motion
for a mistrial as a result of this discovery, the court conducted a
hearing. 79 Based on the juror's answers, the court concluded that
the juror's false answer during voir dire was inadvertent and that
she had been unbiased and impartial. i0 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the court of appeals' conclusion that the defen-
dant had suffered no violation of his right to an impartial jury.'
Deferring to the factual findings of the trial court the supreme
court applied the test in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
Greenwood.' 2 The McDonough test requires the moving party to
"first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a mate-
rial question on voire dire, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause."8 3 Relying on this test, the supreme court held that the ju-
ror was not dishonest and, moreover, there was no evidence of ac-
tual bias on her part."s
173. 267 Va. 291, 590 S.E.2d 365 (2004).
174. Id. at 293, 590 S.E.2d at 366.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 294, 590 S.E.2d at 366-67.
178. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 367.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 295, 590 S.E.2d at 367.
181. Blevins, 267 Va. at 297, 590 S.E.2d at 369.
182. Id. at 296-97, 590 S.E.2d at 368 (applying the two-part test of McDonough, 464
U.S. 548, 556 (1984)).
183. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556.
184. Id. at 297, 590 S.E.2d at 369.
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E. Fourteenth Amendment
In Luttrell v. Commonwealth,"8 5 the defendant's plea agreement
specified that he was to be sentenced in accord with the applica-
ble sentencing guidelines." 6 At his sentencing, the defendant
claimed the court should employ the sentencing guidelines in ef-
fect at the time of the commission of the offense.187 Instead, the
court used the harsher guidelines in effect at the time of sentenc-
ing."s The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined whether this
practice violated the defendant's Due Process rights or whether
the use of the new guidelines constituted an ex post facto applica-
tion of the law.8 9 The court rejected the analogy to Florida's legis-
latively enacted guidelines discussed in Miller v. Florida,9 ' which
require a judge to articulate by clear and convincing evidence any
departure from the presumptive range.'9 ' The Florida court's de-
cision is then reviewed on appeal.'92 In contrast, Virginia's discre-
tionary sentencing guidelines constitute "merely procedural tools
to assist and guide a judge in the exercise of the judge's sentenc-
ing discretion."'93 The trial court is not bound by the guidelines'
presumptive range, and its decision is not subject to appellate re-
view.'94 The Virginia guidelines are not enacted by the legisla-
ture, and the legislature need not approve the changes to the
guidelines. 9 ' Therefore, use of the new guidelines was not an ex
post facto application of the law, and the defendant suffered no
violation of due process when the court considered them.196
185. 42 Va. App. 461, 592 S.E.2d 752 (Ct. App. 2004).
186. Id. at 463, 592 S.E.2d at 753.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 465-67, 592 S.E.2d at 754.
190. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
191. Id. at 426.
192. Id. at 434-35.
193. Luttrell, 42 Va. App. at 468, 592 S.E.2d at 755.
194. Id. at 467, 592 S.E.2d at 755.
195. Id. at 468, 592 S.E.2d at 755.
196. Id.
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III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND TRIALS
A. Trial Court Jurisdiction
The defendant in Jones v. Commonwealth197 pled "no contest"
to charges of distribution of cocaine.' 9 Afterwards, the Common-
wealth presented the testimony of a police officer regarding the
street address where the drug sale took place. 99 Jones argued on
appeal that the circuit court "lacked jurisdiction because the evi-
dence [did] not establish that the [sale] occurred in Virginia--a
prerequisite to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.2"' The
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that Jones's no contest plea ad-
mitted as true all the facts contained in the indictment.2 ' The in-
dictment specified "City of Petersburg, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia" and that Jones sold cocaine in "said city."20 2 The reference
to "said city," the court concluded, "can only logically and gram-
matically be the 'City of Petersburg, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia."'203 Therefore, "the required jurisdictional facts were
proved."20 4
The acquisition of jurisdiction by circuit courts over juvenile de-
fendants has occasioned frequent litigation in the Common-
wealth. In Cook v. Commonwealth,0 5 the juvenile had faced prior
charges that were certified to the circuit court but were then nolle
prosequied. 0 6 When the Commonwealth later brought further
charges, the defendant argued he should be tried in juvenile court
rather than circuit court.20 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed, holding that Virginia Code section 16.1-271 is unambigu-
ous: once a juvenile is "treated as an adult," the juvenile and do-
197. 42 Va. App. 142, 590 S.E.2d 572 (Ct. App. 2004).
198. Id. at 144, 590 S.E.2d at 573.
199. Id. at 145, 590 S.E.2d at 574.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 148, 590 S.E.2d at 575.
202. Id. at 145, 590 S.E.2d at 573-74.
203. Id. at 148, 590 S.E.2d at 575.
204. Id.
205. 268 Va. 111, 597 S.E.2d 84 (2004). For additional information on juveniles tried as
adults, see Shepherd, supra note 137, at 267-68.
206. Id. at 113, 597 S.E.2d at 85. "The effect of a nolle prosequi is to discontinue the
prosecution relative to the charges." Id. at 114, 597 S.E.2d at 85-86.
207. Id. at 113, 597 S.E.2d at 85.
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mestic relations court is divested of jurisdiction. 2°" The nolle
prosequi did not "erase the fact that Cook was treated as an adult
for those proceedings."209
In Austin v. Commonwealth,21 ° following an appeal from the ju-
venile and domestic relations court, the circuit court ordered Aus-
tin committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice; she was
later paroled.211 Several months later, her parole officer filed a pe-
tition with the circuit court seeking to revoke her parole.212 The
circuit court agreed and revoked her parole.2"3 On appeal, Austin
argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over her and the
proceedings should have been conducted in the juvenile and do-
mestic relations court.214 The Court of Appeals of Virginia dis-
agreed. 21' Relying on Virginia Code section 16.1-297, the court
held that "[olnce the circuit court acquires jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the juvenile proceedings until it remands the
matter to the juvenile court, dismisses the proceedings or dis-
charges the juvenile."216 Since the circuit court did none of these
things, it retained jurisdiction to revoke Austin's parole.217
B. Appeals from General District Court
The Supreme Court of Virginia resolved a complex issue re-
garding revocations of suspended time following an appeal to cir-
cuit court from general district court in Commonwealth v. Diaz.2"8
On June 27, 2000, the defendant was convicted in general district
court of driving as an habitual offender-a misdemeanor of-
fense-and given a sentence of ninety days, with seventy days
suspended.219 The sentence was suspended conditional on the de-
208. Id. at 114, 597 S.E.2d at 85-86.
209. Id., 597 S.E.2d at 86.
210. 42 Va. App. 33, 590 S.E.2d 68 (Ct. App. 2003).
211. Id. at 35-36, 590 S.E.2d at 69-70.
212. Id. at 36, 590 S.E.2d at 70.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 37, 590 S.E.2d at 70.
216. Id. at 38, 590 S.E.2d at 71.
217. Id. at 39, 590 S.E.2d at 71.
218. 266 Va. 260, 585 S.E.2d 552 (2003).
219. Id. at 262, 585 S.E.2d at 553.
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fendant's good behavior.2 0 On his way home from court-not
wasting any time-he was arrested for driving after having been
declared an habitual offender, a felony offense.221 On July 5, 2000,
he appealed the district court judgment but withdrew the appeal
on August 1, 2000.222 Three days after Diaz withdrew the appeal,
the circuit court entered an order confirming the misdemeanor
conviction of the general district court. 223 Diaz later pled guilty to
the felony charge. 24 Following a revocation hearing, the circuit
court also revoked the suspended sentence for the misdemeanor
offense. 22' Diaz argued that when the circuit court entered its or-
der affirming the misdemeanor conviction, it abrogated the prior
judgment of the district court.226 Since the period of "good behav-
ior" did not begin until the entry of the circuit court order, he rea-
soned, he could not be subject to revocation for an event that oc-
curred before the entry of the misdemeanor conviction order in
the circuit court.22 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
revocation was proper.228 The court relied on the unambiguous
language of Virginia Code section 16.1-133, which provides that
"[i]f the appeal [from general district court] is withdrawn more
than ten days after conviction, the circuit court shall forthwith
enter an order affirming the judgment of the lower court .... 229
The word "affirm" signifies that a "general district court judg-
ment in the withdrawn appeal remains in effect and is ratified by
the circuit court order."230 Because the general district court order
remained in effect, the defendant's suspended time could be re-
voked for violating the good behavior condition of his suspended
sentence.231
220. Id.
221. Id. at 262-63, 585 S.E.2d at 553.
222. Id. at 263, 585 S.E.2d at 553.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 553-54.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 264, 585 S.E.2d at 553-54.
228. Id. at 266, 585 S.E.2d at 555.
229. Id. at 263, 585 S.E.2d at 553.
230. Id. at 265, 585 S.E.2d at 555.
231. Id. at 265-66, 585 S.E.2d at 555.
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C. Indictments
The Supreme Court of Virginia laid to rest an issue regarding
indictments and proof in cases involving legal persons rather
than natural persons. In Commonwealth v. Nuckles,232 the in-
dictment charged the defendant with grand larceny of goods be-
longing to Breeden Mechanical, Inc.233 The defendant contended
that the failure of the Commonwealth to prove that Breeden Me-
chanical was incorporated was fatal to its case. 4 The Supreme
Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that "[piroof that Breeden
was incorporated at the time of the offense was not necessary to
identify Breeden as the victim of this larceny, nor was Breeden's
corporate status an element of the offense."2 3' Finally, the evi-
dence at trial established that Breeden Mechanical was indeed
the victim. 2 3
6
D. Contemporaneous Objection
It is well established that a defendant must object in a timely
and specific manner to preserve an issue for appellate review.23 v
In Elliott v. Commonwealth,238 the capital defendant's first trial
ended in a mistrial.239 At his retrial, he did not renew a number of
objections raised in his first trial regarding jury instructions on
the "vileness" aggravating factor. 2 0 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia concluded that the rulings of a trial court in a first trial do
not apply in the second trial unless the court adopts them
anew.24' Therefore, a defendant must renew his objections to trial
court rulings in a second trial to preserve the issues for an ap-
peal.242
232. 266 Va. 519, 587 S.E.2d 695 (2003).
233. Id. at 520, 587 S.E.2d at 695.
234. Id. at 522, 587 S.E.2d at 696.
235. Id. at 523, 587 S.E.2d at 697.
236. Id.
237. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 & 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
238. 267 Va. 396, 593 S.E.2d 270 (2004).
239. Id. at 407, 593 S.E.2d at 278.
240. Id. at 408, 593 S.E.2d at 278.
241. Id. at 428, 593 S.E.2d at 290.
242. Id.
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In Edwards v. Commonwealth,243 the Commonwealth charged
the defendant with attempted capital murder of a police officer.244
At trial, the court granted the motion to strike the attempted
capital murder charge but convicted the defendant of assault and
battery.245 On appeal, Edwards argued she could not be convicted
of the battery of a law enforcement officer because the offense is
not a lesser-included offense of attempted capital murder on a po-
lice officer. 246 The Court of Appeals of Virginia first held that the
defendant's argument on appeal was defaulted because she raised
a different ground for reversal than the one argued below. 24" Ed-
wards contended, however, that she could raise the error for the
first time on appeal because the trial court had exceeded its au-
thority by erroneously convicting her of a lesser-included offense
that was not actually a lesser-included offense.248 She relied on
Lowe v. Commonwealth249 and Fontaine v. Commonwealth,25 ° two
decisions reversing convictions under similar circumstances. Af-
ter analyzing the reasoning in Lowe and Fontaine, the court held
that Lowe and Fontaine erroneously equate "the authority to ex-
ercise jurisdiction with basic jurisdictional requirements."25 ' That
distinction, the court held, was abolished in Nelson v. Warden of
the Keen Mountain Correctional Center . 2 " Therefore, the court
said it was "required to overrule those decisions to the extent that
they conclude a conviction of an offense that is not a lesser-
included offense of the indicted charge renders the judgment void,
i.e., it can be raised at any time in any court."253 Accordingly, the
contemporaneous objection rule barred appellate review, and the
court affirmed the defendant's conviction.254
243. 41 Va. App. 752, 589 S.E.2d 444 (Ct. App. 2003).
244. Id. at 756, 589 S.E.2d at 446.
245. Id. at 758-59, 589 S.E.2d at 446-47.
246. Id. at 759, 589 S.E.2d at 252.
247. Id. at 760, 589 S.E.2d at 447.
248. Id. at 761, 589 S.E.2d at 448.
249. 33 Va. App. 583, 535 S.E.2d 689 (Ct. App. 2000).
250. 25 Va. App. 156, 487 S.E.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1997).
251. Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 765, 589 S.E.2d at 450.
252. Id. (citing Nelson, 262 Va. 276, 281, 552 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2001)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 767, 589 S.E.2d at 451.
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E. Disqualifying a Commonwealth's Attorney
In Powell v. Commonwealth,255 following his first trial for capi-
tal murder, the defendant wrote a taunting, offensive letter to the
Commonwealth's Attorney.256 In his second trial, he filed a motion
to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney and his office, argu-
ing the letter created a conflict of interest.2"7 The trial court de-
nied the motion.25 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
framed the issue as "whether, on the facts of a particular case,
the adversarial nature of the judicial process has resulted in such
enmity toward the defendant on the part of the prosecutor that it
will overbear his professional judgment in seeking fairly and im-
partially to see justice done."2"9 "One-sided acrimony," the court
noted, does not "establish a conflict."26 ° To prevail, "[tihe evidence
must reflect that the prosecutor is acting not within the dictates
of the law, but has strayed outside those parameters in further-
ance of a personal animus against the defendant."2"1 In this in-
stance, the trial court could properly credit the prosecutor's as-
surance that the letter "had [no] .. . effect on his professional
judgment."262 Moreover, the court observed that "nothing in the
Commonwealth's Attorney's conduct of the trial evinces any lack
of such professional judgment on his part."263
F. Trial Court Recusal
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Jackson2 64 contended that
the trial judge should have recused himself from a probation
revocation hearing because he was the Commonwealth's Attorney
when the defendant was originally tried and convicted for the un-
derlying offense. 26" The defendant cited the canons of judicial
255. 267 Va. 107, 590 S.E.2d 537 (2004).
256. Id. at 117-18, 590 S.E.2d at 544. For further discussion of this case, see supra
notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
257. Powell, 267 Va. at 138, 590 S.E.2d at 556.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 139, 590 S.E.2d at 556.
260. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 557.
261. Id..
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 267 Va. 226, 590 S.E.2d 518 (2004).
265. Id. at 228, 590 S.E.2d at 519.
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conduct in support of his motion.266 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia first held that a violation of the canons of judicial conduct,
while significant, does not compel recusal.267 The court also reit-
erated that a probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal
proceeding.268 Therefore, the judge did not in fact successively
function as both accuser and trier-of-fact.2 69 The court refused to
adopt a per se rule that a former Commonwealth's Attorney ap-
pointed to the bench must recuse himself or herself "in any mat-
ter involving individuals who had committed a crime or been
prosecuted at the time that the judge was Commonwealth's At-
torney."270 Instead, the moving party must prove bias or preju-
dice, which the defendant failed to do.27' Without evidence of bias
or prejudice, the decision for recusal is one within the discretion
of the judge. 2 The record in Jackson showed no abuse of that
discretion.273
G. Trial Court Conduct
In Via v. Commonwealth,274 the defendant complained that the
trial court erred "by prompting and soliciting evidentiary objec-
tions from the Commonwealth in front of the jury and by berating
and belittling defense counsel in her efforts to present proper de-
fense evidence.' 275 The Court of Appeals of Virginia found no
prejudice from the comments of the trial court, noting that "the
trial court specifically instructed the jury, at the beginning of
trial, that his comments and demeanor should not be interpreted
as indicative of his opinion."276 The court further held that consid-
ering "the trial court's statements in their proper context, it is
clear that the trial court, while obviously impatient and abrupt on
occasions, was equally so with both parties."277 The court of ap-
266. Id. at 228, 590 S.E.2d at 519.
267. Id. at 228-29, 590 S.E.2d at 519.
268. Id. at 229, 590 S.E.2d at 519.
269. Id.
270. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 519.
271. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 519-20.
272. Id., 590 S.E.2d at 520.
273. Id. at 230, 590 S.E.2d at 520.
274. 42 Va. App. 164, 590 S.E.2d 583 (Ct. App. 2004).
275. Id. at 180, 590 S.E.2d at 591.
276. Id. at 182, 590 S.E.2d at 592.
277. Id.
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peals did not "condone certain comments and the occasional lapse
in the judicial demeanor of the trial court," but nevertheless, the
court found "no evidence of substantial bias on the part of the
judge."278
IV. EVIDENCE
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
In Via v. Commonwealth,279 the defendant was charged with
sodomy of a child under the age of thirteen.2 ° The defendant
hired an expert, Dr. Joseph C. Conley, "to assist him in evaluat-
ing the complainant, suggest defense theories, and method of
presentations of those theories at trial."2"' The prosecution issued
a subpoena duces tecum to Dr. Conley demanding the production
of medical and counseling notes relating to the complaining wit-
ness.282 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to quash the
subpoena on the grounds that the attorney-client privilege and
Rule 3A:11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
preclude disclosure of the records. 23 The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed, 2' holding the records were not protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 285 First, the court noted that while
"'[t]he privilege attaches to communications of the client made to
the attorney's agents ... when such agent's services are indispen-
sable to the attorney's effective representation of the client,' 286
the privilege is "strictly construed," and the defendant bears the
burden of demonstrating its applicability. 287 In this case, the de-
fendant proffered no evidence to demonstrate the "indispensabil-
ity" of Dr. Conley's records.28 8 Second, the plain language of Rule
278. Id.
279. 42 Va. App. 164, 590 S.E,2d 583 (Ct. App. 2004).
280. Id. at 169, 590 S.E.2d at 585-86.
281. Id. at 188, 590 S.E.2d at 595.
282. Id. at 170, 590 S.E.2d at 586.
283. Id. at 170-71, 590 S.E.2d at 586.
284. Id. at 180, 590 S.E.2d at 591.
285. Id. at 188-89, 590 S.E.2d at 595.
286. Id. at 188, 590 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 235 Va. 499,
508-09, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (1988)).
287. See id. at 188-89, 590 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Edwards, 235 Va. at 508-09, 370
S.E.2d at 301).
288. Id. at 189, 590 S.E.2d at 595.
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3A:11 limits its application to documents in the hands of the de-
fendant, whereas the documents at issue were held by a third
party. 89 Therefore, the rule did not apply to the Commonwealth's
subpoena.29°
B. Business Records
Criminal prosecutions frequently invoke the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. In Parker v. Commonwealth,291 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed whether medical records,
authenticated through the custodian of the records, were properly
admitted in a malicious wounding case.292 The records in question
consisted of statements recorded by a doctor and two nurses con-
cerning how the defendant had sustained an injury.29 The re-
cords corroborated the Commonwealth's theory that the defen-
dant had injured his hand while attacking the victim with a glass
bottle.294 The defendant asserted the prosecution failed to estab-
lish a proper foundation for the documents because the Com-
monwealth failed to prove that the doctor and two nurses were
unavailable. 295 The court held that under the facts of this case,
these witnesses were commercially unavailable, because "'the
practical inconvenience of producing" the doctor and two nurses
"'outweigh[ed] the probable utility of doing so.""296
C. Identity of Person Listed in Prior Conviction Orders
As a part of its burden of proving that John Anthony Holmes
was previously convicted of domestic assault, the prosecution in
289. Id. at 189-90, 590 S.E.2d at 595.
290. Id. at 190, 590 S.E.2d at 595-96.
291. 41 Va. App. 643, 587 S.E.2d 749 (Ct. App. 2003).
292. Id. at 646, 587 S.E.2d at 750. For further discussion of the use of medical records
in other contexts see Michael L. Goodman, Kathleen M. McCauley & Suzanne S. Duvall,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Discovery Divide: Virginia Code Section 8.01-581's Quality
Assurance Privilege and its Protection of Healthcare Provider Policies and Incident Re-
ports, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 61 (2004).
293. Id. at 648, 587 S.E.2d at 751.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 648-9, 587 S.E.2d at 751.
296. Id. at 653, 587 S.E.2d at 753-54 (quoting French v. Virginian Ry. Co., 121 Va. 383,
386, 93 S.E. 585, 585 (1917)).
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Holmes v. Commonwealth9 7 introduced certified copies of convic-
tion orders from a different jurisdiction.298 Holmes argued that
the prosecution had failed to establish he was the person named
in these orders, but offered no supporting evidence.299 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia held that the fact that the defendant's
name was the same as the name listed on the orders created a
permissible inference that the defendant was the person named
in the orders."° This inference was supported by additional fac-
tors: the defendant's name is not a common one and the offenses
all occurred in an adjoining jurisdiction by adult males of like
age.301 Accordingly, the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was the person named in the conviction orders.0 2
D. Dog Trailing
In Pelletier v. Commonwealth, °3 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia concluded that the trial court properly admitted evidence
from a dog trailing expert.30 4 The Commonwealth adduced evi-
dence showing a bloodhound started following a trail from the
scene where the victim's body was recovered and followed it to the
defendant's residence.3 5 The defendant objected to this testimony
on the basis that it lacked the scientific foundation that must pre-
cede all expert testimony.3 6 The court concluded that a scientific
foundation is not required in every area of expert testimony.
30 7
With certain kinds of evidence, "experience and observation in a
special calling" will provide a proper foundation.0 To admit ex-
pert testimony on dog trailing, the "dog trailing evidence must be
empirically shown to be reliable from experience."3 9 In this case,
the court held that "[tihe showing of reliability is met by testi-
297. 41 Va. App. 690, 589 S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App. 2003).
298. Id. at 692, 589 S.E.2d at 12.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 693, 589 S.E.2d at 12.
302. Id.
303. 42 Va. App. 406, 592 S.E.2d 382 (Ct. App. 2004).
304. Id. at 422-23, 592 S.E.2d at 390.
305. Id. at 415-16, 592 S.E.2d at 386-87.
306. Id. at 419, 592 S.E.2d at 388.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 420, 592 S.E.2d at 389.
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mony from the handler establishing that he 'was qualified to
work with the dog and to interpret its responses' and that 'the dog
was a sufficiently trained and proven tracker of human scent.' 31 °
The court also held that Virginia law "does not require definitive
proof of the defendant's presence at a particular place on the
trail" as a prerequisite to the admission of dog trailing evi-
dence."' l Rather, the evidence must establish "a nexus with the
defendant's location and the commission of the crime under in-
vestigation."312 That nexus was present in this case because direct
and circumstantial evidence placed the defendant in the area
where the trail began.313
E. Expert Assistance
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Commonwealth v. San-
chez,314 reversed the court of appeals decision that the defendant
had shown the required "particularized need" for a DNA expert.315
In response to a request for funds to employ a DNA expert, the
court originally granted Sanchez $3,000.3"6 Before trial, Sanchez
sought additional funds. 317 He explained that the expert he hired
had depleted the allotted funds in reviewing extensive documen-
tation at the state laboratory.318 Sanchez said he needed addi-
tional funds to pay for the expert's trial testimony. 319 He also prof-
fered that the expert had identified errors in the state procedures
employed to process his DNA and in the way the examination was
performed.320 The supreme court stated that "[a] review of San-
chez' proffer reflects that it rests only on conclusory assertions;
nothing in his proffer is particularized." 32' His arguments, the
court noted, reflected nothing more than his "hope or suspicion"
310. Id. (quoting Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 233, 294 S.E.2d 882, 893
(1982)).
311. Id. at 422, 592 S.E.2d at 390.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 422-23, 592 S.E.2d at 390.
314. 268 Va. 161, 597 S.E.2d 197 (2004).
315. Id. at 167, 597 S.E.2d at 200.
316. Id. at 163, 597 S.E.2d at 198.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 163-64, 597 S.E.2d at 198.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 164, 597 S.E.2d at 198.
321. Id. at 166, 597 S.E.2d at 200.
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that he could adduce favorable evidence with regard to the DNA
evidence.322 Consequently, the trial court committed no error in
denying Sanchez's request for additional funds. 23
F. Polygraph Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia has long held that polygraph
evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials due to its unreliabil-
ity.324 In White v. Commonwealth,325 the court of appeals held that
polygraph evidence, which demonstrated untruthful responses on
behalf of a probationer, is also inadmissible at a hearing to revoke
a suspended portion of a probationer's sentence.326
G. Prior Crimes
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 permits the Commonwealth to
introduce evidence of a defendant's "prior criminal convictions"
during the sentencing phase of a jury trial.327 In Jaccard v. Com-
monwealth,2  the defendant complained that the Commonwealth
improperly introduced evidence of a probation revocation. 329 The
Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, holding that probation revoca-
tions do not constitute prior convictions under the statute.33 °
H. Rape Shield
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Pilcher v. Common-
wealth33' that the rape shield law, which excludes certain evi-
dence of a victim's prior sexual conduct, does not constitute an
unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to this defendant.332
322. Id.
323. Id. at 167, 597 S.E.2d at 200.
324. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 156, 341 S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986).
325. 41 Va. App. 191, 583 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 2003).
326. Id. at 194, 583 S.E.2d at 772.
327. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
328. 268 Va. 56, 597 S.E.2d 30 (2004).
329. Id. at 57, 597 S.E.2d at 30.
330. Id. at 59, 597 S.E.2d at 31.
331. 41 Va. App. 158, 583 S.E.2d 70 (Ct. App. 2003).
332. Id. at 169, 583 S.E.2d at 75; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; VA. CONST. art. 1, §
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The defendant, who was convicted of raping a child, complained
that the law changed the rules of evidence in effect at the time he
committed the crime in a manner that prejudiced his defense.333
The court noted that rules of evidence and procedure which do
not affect the "'quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a con-
viction"' do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause.334
I. Sex Crime Victim Impeachment
In general, "a witness' character may not be impeached by
showing specific acts of untruthfulness or bad conduct."335 How-
ever, "the complaining witness [in sex offense cases] may be
cross-examined about prior false accusations, and if the witness
denies making the statement, the defense may submit proof of
such charges."336 Such accusations are admissible "only if a court
makes a threshold determination that a reasonable probability of
falsity exists."337
In Richardson v. Commonwealth,338 the defendant sought to
impeach the testimony of the complaining witness, alleging she
had previously made false allegations of sexual misconduct
against another person.339 These prior allegations were false, he
claimed, because the person against whom she made the allega-
tions denied them.340 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
such "inherently self-serving" denials do not, by themselves, es-
tablish a reasonable probability of falsity.341 Therefore, the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in excluding this testi-
mony.342
9.
333. Pilcher, 41 Va. App. at 164, 583 S.E.2d at 73.
334. Id. at 167-68, 583 S.E.2d at 74-75 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 529
(2000)).
335. Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 323-24, 368 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1988).
336. Id. at 325, 368 S.E.2d at 266 (citing State v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195, 198-99
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978)).
337. Id.
338. 42 Va. App. 236, 590 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 2004).
339. Id. at 238, 590 S.E.2d at 619.
340. Id. at 239, 590 S.E.2d at 619.
341. Id. at 242, 590 S.E.2d at 621.
342. Id.
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V. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Arson
In Schwartz v. Commonwealth,43 the defendant, accompanied
by other high school students, went on a vandalism spree in Hen-
rico County, Virginia.344 The group set on fire a truck that was
parked in the driveway.34 The fire destroyed the truck, spread to
another vehicle, and severely damaged the house.34 Schwartz
was ultimately convicted of three counts of arson.347 The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the plain language of the
statute permits multiple arson convictions for one act of igni-
tion.34' The court cautioned, however, that each item of property
destroyed in the ensuing fire could not produce a separate convic-
tion.349 According to the court, to hold otherwise, would produce
absurd results.350
B. Carjacking
In Spencer v. Commonwealth,35 ' the victim left her car running
and got out to drop off her rental check. 352 The defendant took ad-
vantage of the victim's absence to slide into the driver's seat. 3
Thinking it was a joke, the victim stood in front of the car for a
moment.5 4 The defendant "put the car in gear and bumped [the
victim's] legs with the car."35 She suffered bruising as a result
and quickly moved out of the way to avoid being run over.356
343. 267 Va. 751, 594 S.E.2d 925 (2004). For additional discussion of the case, see
Shepherd, supra note, 137, at 268.
344. Id. at 752, 594 S.E.2d at 925.
345. Id. at 753, 594 S.E.2d at 926.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 754, 594 S.E.2d at 926.
349. Id. at 754-55, 594 S.E.2d at 927.
350. Id. at 755, 594 S.E.2d at 927.
351. 42 Va. App. 443, 592 S.E.2d 400 (Ct. App. 2004).
352. Id. at 446, 592 S.E.2d at 401.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id., 592 S.E.2d at 401-02.
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At trial, the defendant was convicted of carjacking." 7 He ar-
gued on appeal that, since the victim no longer had possession of
the car, he could not be convicted of carjacking. 58 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that the evidence was sufficient to show
that the victim still retained possession.359 The court noted:
The taking and asportation of [the victim's] vehicle was accom-
plished only when Spencer intimidated and forced her to move from
the path of the vehicle as he attempted to take the car. At that junc-
ture, and only then, did Spencer establish his "absolute control of the
property".. . and thereby sever [the victim's] control.360
C. Child Abuse and Neglect
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided two significant cases
this term involving felony child neglect. 361 The first case, Com-
362monwealth v. Duncan, was an appeal by the Commonwealth
from a decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, reversing the
defendant's conviction for felony child neglect based upon a find-
ing of insufficient evidence. 63 The supreme court reversed the de-
cision of the court of appeals and held that the defendant's acts
and omissions relating to the care of his six-month-old son consti-
tuted felony child neglect. 3' The supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals that acts of simple negligence are insufficient to
prove the offense under the applicable statute, but that the re-
quired "reckless disregard" for the child's life could be shown "by
conduct that subjects a child to a substantial risk of serious in-
jury, as well as to a risk of death, because exposure to either type
of risk can endanger the child's life."365 The supreme court con-
cluded that the record demonstrated a "pattern of neglect over an
extended period that ended in Duncan's knowing and reckless de-
357. Id. at 447, 592 S.E.2d at 402.
358. Id. at 450, 592 S.E.2d at 403.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 451, 592 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 256,
105 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1958)).
361. See Shepherd, supra note 137, at 276-77.
362. 267 Va. 377, 593 S.E.2d 210 (2004).
363. Id. at 379, 380, 593 S.E.2d at 211, 212.
364. Id. at 386, 593 S.E.2d at 215.
365. Id. at 385, 593 S.E.2d at 215.
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cision to feed an alcoholic beverage to his baby who had been de-
prived of food and hydration for several hours."366
In Barrett v. Commonwealth,367 the defendant returned at 6:00
a.m. after a night of extensive drinking and fell asleep, leaving
her ten-month-old son with her two-year-old daughter.368 The de-
fendant awoke six hours later to find that the ten-month-old had
drowned, apparently by being dragged into the bathtub by the
two-year-old.36 9 The two-year-old had previously demonstrated a
violent jealousy by dragging the baby boy into the bathtub shortly
before the incident at issue and had committed other acts of vio-
lence against the baby. ° The trial court convicted the defendant
of two counts of felony child neglect.37' Under such circumstances,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held the defendant's actions con-
stituted more than "ordinary negligence."372 Indeed, the factual
scenario represented was a foreseeable "disaster just waiting to
happen."373 Not only was the boy clearly in danger, the court held,
but the defendant had a duty to prevent her daughter from in-
flicting injury upon her son and also to protect her daughter from
injury.374
D. Contempt
In Robinson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed the defendant's sentence for contempt.37 6 The court
held that the defendant, an attorney, had "knowingly created a
conflict in his schedule, setting cases on the same morning in two
separate jurisdictions that were some distance apart" and then
failed to appear on time for his case in one of the jurisdictions. 7
366. Id. at 386, 593 S.E.2d at 215.
367. 268 Va. 170, 597 S.E.2d 104 (2004).
368. Id. at 180, 597 S.E.2d at 108-09.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 180-81, 597 S.E.2d at 109-110.
371. Id. at 173-74, 597 S.E.2d at 105. She was convicted of a Class 4 felony for the
death of her son and a Class 6 felony for the neglect of her daughter. Id., 597 S.E.2d at
105.
372. Id. at 184, 597 S.E.2d at 111.
373. Id. at 185, 597 S.E.2d at 112.
374. Id.
375. 41 Va. App. 137, 583 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 2003).
376. Id. at 139, 583 S.E.2d at 61.
377. Id. at 144, 583 S.E.2d at 63.
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The court further held that the trial court could properly sentence
the attorney in excess of the minimum prescribed by Virginia
Code sections 18.2-456(1) and 18.2-457, as these statutes did not
apply. The court drew a distinction between statutory, "direct"
contempt, and common law, "indirect," contempt.37 9 The trial
court in this case had appropriately relied on indirect contempt
by proceeding via the formal process of issuing a show cause or-
der.380 The court provided the defendant with an opportunity to
prepare for his defense and conducted a hearing.3 ' Therefore, the
court was not limited by the statutory provisions in imposing a
sentence. 2
E. Felony Escape
In White v. Commonwealth,13 the defendant was stopped be-
cause his vehicle lacked a front license plate.314 While he was be-
ing held, the officer performed a protective pat-down.385 When the
officer felt little rocks in the defendant's pocket, he asked him if
the rocks were crack cocaine.386 The defendant then attacked the
officer and ran away.38 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia examined
whether the defendant was "in custody," a prerequisite to a con-
viction under Virginia Code section 18.2-479(B). 38 The Court
held:
[An individual is in the custody of a law enforcement officer only
where there has been a clear and effective restraint of the individual
by the officer, either by having the individual in his physical control
or by the individual's voluntary submission to the officer's authority,
such that the individual's freedom of movement is curtailed to a de-
gree associated with a formal arrest.
38 9
378. Id. at 144-45, 583 S.E.2d at 63-64.
379. Id. at 145-46, 583 S.E.2d at 64.
380. Id. at 146, 583 S.E.2d at 64.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. 267 Va. 96, 591 S.E.2d 662 (2004).
384. Id. at 99, 591 S.E.2d at 663.
385. Id. at 99, 591 S.E.2d at 664.
386. Id. at 99-100, 591 S.E.2d at 664.
387. Id. at 100, 591 S.E.2d at 664.
388. Id. at 102-06, 591 S.E.2d at 665-68.
389. Id. at 106, 591 S.E.2d at 667-68.
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In the case under review, the defendant's investigative deten-
tion and the ensuing protective pat-down did not constitute "cus-
tody."39 ° Therefore, his flight was not flight from "custody" as re-
quired by the statute, and the evidence was insufficient for a
conviction.39'
F. Firearm Offenses
In Esteban v. Commonwealth,392 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether the statute forbidding the possession of a fire-
arm on school grounds required any proof of a specified mental
state. 393 The defendant, an art teacher, testified she simply forgot
about the presence of the gun in the canvas bag she was carry-
ing.394 The court concluded the purpose of the statute was to as-
sure a safe environment on school grounds and "[tihe fact that a
person, under the circumstances of this case, innocently brings a
loaded revolver onto school property does not diminish that dan-
ger."395 The court reasoned that inserting a mens rea element into
the statute would defeat the purpose of the law and add language
to the statute that the General Assembly chose not to include.396
Consequently, the offense was one of strict liability. 397
The attraction of convicted felons towards firearms seems to be
exceeded only by their propensity to be caught with them. Vir-
ginia appellate courts issued a number of decisions on this sub-
ject. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a defendant's con-
viction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in Kingsbur v.
Commonwealth.39" The certificate of analysis for the gun in ques-
tion stated that it could not be test-fired because there were ten
missing parts.399 The court held that despite the handgun's state
of disrepair, it nevertheless constituted a firearm because it could
390. Id. at 105, 591 S.E.2d at 667.
391. Id. at 106, 591 S.E.2d at 668.
392. 266 Va. 605, 587 S.E.2d 523 (2003).
393. Id. at 606, 587 S.E.2d at 524.
394. Id. at 608, 587 S.E.2d at 525.
395. Id. at 609-10, 587 S.E.2d at 526.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. 267 Va. 348, 593 S.E.2d 208 (2004).
399. Id. at 350, 593 S.E.2d at 209.
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be repaired.4 °° The defendant in Alger v. Commonwealth,4 1' a con-
victed felon, contended she could lawfully possess a firearm in her
home.412 She relied on Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2, which
prohibits a convicted felon from possessing or transporting "any
(a) firearm or (b) stun weapon or taser as defined in § 18.2-308.1
except in such person's residence or the curtilage thereof....
The court disagreed with this interpretation, holding that the
word "except" applied only to the clause "stun weapon or taser"
and not to "firearm."40 4 In Quesenberry v. Commonwealth,4 °5 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that a flare gun met the
definition of a firearm and, therefore, a convicted felon was prop-
erly precluded from possessing one.40 6
The defendant in Branch v. Commonwealth0 7 claimed that he
was confused about his status as a convicted felon due to state-
ments by the trial court after his conviction and by the store clerk
who sold him the gun.40 8 Due to this confusion, he argued, he did
not knowingly violate the law prohibiting him from possessing a
firearm. 4 9 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the statute
prohibiting the possession of a firearm after having been con-
victed of a felony, Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2, contained no
scienter or mens rea elements. 41 0 Therefore, the defendant's con-
fusion, his lack of intent to mislead, or his failure to knowingly
violate the law were all of "no moment."4 ' The court recognized a
limited due process exception when a defendant reasonably relies
on assurances by certain government officials that the conduct is
lawful; however, that issue was not raised in this case.4"2
400. Id. at 352, 593 S.E.2d at 210.
401. 267 Va. 255, 590 S.E.2d 563 (2004).
402. Id. at 256-57, 590 S.E.2d at 564.
403. Id. at 257, 590 S.E.2d at 564 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2(A) (Repl. Vol.
2004)).
404. Id. at 260, 590 S.E.2d at 566.
405. 41 Va. App. 126, 583 S.E.2d 55 (Ct. App. 2003).
406. Id. at 129, 583 S.E.2d at 56.
407. 42 Va. App. 665, 593 S.E.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2004).
408. Id. at 667-68, 593 S.E.2d at 836.
409. Id. at 668, 593 S.E.2d at 836.
410. Id. at 669, 593 S.E.2d at 836-37.
411. Id. at 670, 593 S.E.2d at 837.
412. Id. at 671, 593 S.E.2d at 837-38.
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G. Driving While an Habitual Offender
In Norman v. Commonwealth,413 the defendant pled guilty in
1989 to driving while an habitual offender.414 Ten years later, in
1999, the court entered an order granting his petition to have his
license restored.4 15 The court imposed certain conditions, how-
ever, such as prohibiting the defendant from possessing illegal
drugs or alcohol.416 In 2001, after the defendant was found driving
while intoxicated, he was convicted of driving while an habitual
offender, second or subsequent offense.41 v He argued that he could
not be convicted of driving as an habitual offender because the
1999 order terminated his status as an habitual offender.418 The
en banc court of appeals agreed.4"9 The court analyzed Virginia
Code section 46.2-360(1) and noted that a court disposing of a pe-
tition for restoration of the privilege to drive has three options:
"(1) deny the petition; (2) restore the person's privilege to drive,
with or without conditions enforceable by the court; or (3) author-
ize the issuance of a restricted license."42 ° The court observed that
the statute draws no distinction between a "full restoration" and
a "conditional restoration."4 2' "The fact that the court prescribed
certain conditions in restoring Norman's privilege to drive and,
thus, retained authority to enforce those conditions, does not alter
the conclusion that Norman's privilege to drive was restored."422
Therefore, the 1999 order terminated Norman's status as an ha-
bitual offender, and the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
was driving as an habitual offender in 200 1.423
413. 41 Va. App. 628, 587 S.E.2d 742 (Ct. App. 2003).
414. Id. at 632, 587 S.E.2d at 743.
415. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 743-44.
416. Id. at 632-33, 587 S.E.2d at 743-44.
417. Id. at 634, 587 S.E.2d at 744.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 639, 587 S.E.2d at 747.
420. Id. at 636, 587 S.E.2d at 745.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 637-38, 587 S.E.2d at 746.
423. Id. at 638-39, 587 S.E.2d at 746-47.
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H. Fraudulent Advance of Money
In Holsapple v. Commonwealth,424 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia affirmed the Court of Appeals of Virginia and addressed a
number of issues relating to a charge of obtaining a fraudulent
advance of money upon a promise to perform construction
work.4 15 Virginia Code section 18.2-200.1 requires the person who
requested the construction work to prove she requested a return
of funds advanced for the work by sending a notice via certified
mail, return receipt requested.426 The statute does not require
proof, however, that the defendant actually received this notice.427
Holsapple also argued that the court of appeals erred in conclud-
ing that faulty workmanship could constitute a failure to per-
form. The supreme court disagreed,429 finding that the defen-
dant's conduct "reeks with fraud" and "[e]verything about the
uninhabitable structure.., displays a gross misperformance and
corner-cutting on Holsapple's part .... ,,4"0 Accordingly, the court
affirmed Holsapple's conviction.43'
I. Failure to Stop at Scene of an Accident
In Edwards v. Commonwealth,43 2 the defendant eventually
stopped her car after leading the police on a chase.433 A police offi-
cer approached the car, reached in and grabbed the driver's
arm.434 At that moment, the defendant drove off, dragging the of-
ficer.435 The officer managed to extricate himself but was injured
in the process.436 Edwards's car continued to move, striking two
other vehicles, including a police car, and afterwards drifted
424. 266 Va. 593, 587 S.E.2d 561 (2003), affg en banc, Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 39
Va. App. 522, 574 S.E.2d 756 (Ct. App. 2003).
425. Id. at 595, 604, 587 S.E.2d at 562, 567.
426. Holsapple, 266 Va. at 599, 587 S.E.2d at 564.
427. Id. at 599, 587 S.E.2d at 565.
428. Id. at 601, 587 S.E.2d at 565-66.
429. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 566.
430. Id. at 602, 603, 587 S.E.2d at 566.
431. Id. at 604, 587 S.E.2d at 567.
432. 41 Va. App. 752, 589 S.E.2d 444 (Ct. App. 2003).
433. Id. at 757, 589 S.E.2d at 446.
434. Id. at 757-58, 589 S.E.2d at 446.
435. Id. at 758, 589 S.E.2d at 446.
436. Id.
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along for 100 feet before stopping. 3 ' The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held that "the evidence was sufficient to convict [Edwards]
of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. "438
The court said the statutory language requires affirmative action
to "'immediately stop' and "plainly does not allow a person to
continue driving until circumstances stop the vehicle."439 The
court noted that the defendant "could have applied the brakes to
stop the car."440 Furthermore, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that she did not leave the scene." 1 Edwards relied on
Smith v. Commonwealth,442 a case interpreting Virginia Code sec-
tion 19.2-81, which permits an arrest without a warrant at the
"scene of the accident."" 3 In Smith, a defendant was held to be
properly arrested, within 100 yards from the collision, because
she was "at the scene of the accident."444 The court in Edwards
distinguished the two statutes, holding that the hit-and-run stat-
ute, "[b]y requiring a driver to stop immediately and as close to
the 'scene' as possible ... distinguishes and limits the area la-
beled 'the scene' in a manner that Code § 19.2-81 does not."445
J. Robbery
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the issue of
when a larceny becomes a robbery. In Commonwealth v. Jones,"
the defendant walked out of a store with a pair of boots without
paying for them."7 When confronted by the store manager in the
parking lot, Jones pulled out a gun and ordered the manager to
back off."8 The manager complied, allowing Jones to flee. 944 At
trial, Jones was convicted of robbery.45 He argued that he should
437. Id.
438. Id. at 770, 589 S.E.2d at 452-53.
439. Id. at 768-69, 589 S.E.2d at 452.
440. Id. at 769, 589 S.E.2d at 452.
441. Id.
442. 32 Va. App. 228, 527 S.E.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2000).
443. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
444. Smith, 32 Va. App. at 238, 527 S.E.2d at 461.
445. Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 770, 589 S.E.2d at 452.
446. 267 Va. 284, 591 S.E.2d 68 (2004).
447. Id. at 286, 591 S.E.2d at 69-70.
448. Id., 591 S.E.2d at 70.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 285, 591 S.E.2d at 69.
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have been convicted of larceny rather than robbery, because he
had successfully taken the boots before he resorted to force. 45' The
court held that Jones had mere custody, not possession, of the
boots.452 The store retained constructive possession of the goods.453
Before Jones could successfully convert his custody into posses-
sion, he was confronted by the store manager.4 4 Since Jones used
force before he had gained possession, the court properly con-
victed him of robbery.4 5
K. Using a Communications System to Solicit Sex with a Minor
In Brooker v. Commonwealth,5 6 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed the defendant's three convictions for soliciting sex
with a minor.457 The defendant not only discussed, in graphic
terms, sexual acts with the undercover detective posing as a mi-
nor, but he also sent live pictures of his genitals via web cam-
era.45" These actions constituted more than "words alone."459 The
court found it immaterial that the defendant and the purported
victim were located in different cities while exchanging communi-
cations because solicitation can be "'completed before an attempt
is made to complete the solicited crime.'4 6° The court also rejected
the defendant's argument that his actions "constituted a single
continuing offense" because the offenses occurred on three differ-
ent dates with "distinct and separate communications."46' Finally,
the court held that a defendant can be convicted of exposing him-
self to a minor via web camera because the statutory language
does not require a defendant to expose himself in a public loca-
tion.46 2
451. Id. at 287, 591 S.E.2d at 70.
452. Id. at 290, 591 S.E.2d at 72.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. 41 Va. App. 609, 587 S.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 2003). For a further discussion of this
issue, see Shepherd, supra note 137, at 275.
457. Id. at 611, 587 S.E.2d at 733.
458. Id. at 612-13, 587 S.E.2d at 733-34.
459. Id. at 614, 587 S.E.2d at 735.
460. Id. at 615, 587 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting Pedersen v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061,
1067-68, 254 S.E.2d 95, 99 (1979)).
461. Id.
462. Id. at 616, 587 S.E.2d at 735-36.
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VI. POST TRIAL
A. Detention Center Eligibility
In Word v. Commonwealth,4"3 the defendant was convicted of
several felonies.464 After he was found to be eligible for participa-
tion in the Detention Center Incarceration Program (the "Pro-
gram"), the trial court imposed a mostly suspended sentence con-
ditioned on the successful completion of the Program.465 The
Commonwealth's Attorney later contacted the Program when he
learned that federal authorities were investigating the defendant
for two 1993 murders and that indictments were "likely... forth-
coming." "' The Program then rescinded the petitioner's eligibility
because the petitioner could be arrested and would thus be un-
able to complete the Program.41 7 Following a show cause hearing,
the trial court revoked a portion of the suspended sentence and
also found that the defendant had violated the terms of his proba-
tion.4 6' The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's
revocation of the suspended sentence.469 The court held:
[Wihen Word could no longer satisfy the prerequisite condition under
which his sentence was suspended, i.e. that he enter and success-
fully complete two Department programs, the court had the author-
ity to reconsider the suspended sentences... and to determine what
portion of the suspended sentences or other alternatives to incar-
ceration would be appropriate in lieu of the confinement that had
been ordered in the community-based programs.
47 0
The defendant, however, had not committed any willful acts that
would justify the revocation of probation, and the crimes for
which federal authorities were investigating the defendant oc-
curred before the imposition of a term of probation.47'
463. 41 Va. App. 496, 586 S.E.2d 282 (Ct. App. 2003).
464. Id. at 499, 586 S.E.2d at 283.
465. Id. at 499-500, 586 S.E.2d at 283-84.
466. Id. at 500, 586 S.E.2d at 284.
467. Id. at 501, 586 S.E.2d at 284.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 508, 586 S.E.2d at 287.
470. Id. at 505, 586 S.E.2d at 286.
471. Id. at 507, 586 S.E.2d at 287.
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B. Writs of Actual Innocence
In Gaston v. Commonwealth,472 the petitioner invoked Virginia
Code section 19.2-327.1 to seek post-trial DNA testing.473 The
trial court denied his request. 74 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that it had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal
under the plain language of the statute.475
VII. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CRIMINAL LAW
A. Assault on a Family or Household Member
The legislature expanded the list of predicate crimes that qual-
ify a defendant for an enhanced penalty for assaulting a family or
household member. 476 The "look back" time frame, under which a
repeat offender can face enhanced punishment, was also ex-
panded from ten to twenty years.477 Finally, a defendant who is
convicted of assaulting a family member need only have two prior
qualifying offenses to face enhanced punishment, rather than the
three offenses previously required."7
B. Driving While Intoxicated
On July 1, 2004, Virginia laws became harsher for drunk driv-
ers. Under prior law, drivers apprehended with elevated levels of
blood-alcohol, defined as at least 0.20 and 0.25, faced mandatory
minimum penalties.4 79 The General Assembly lowered those
thresholds to 0.15 and 0.20.4"' The legislature also increased the
472. 266 Va. 175, 585 S.E.2d 596 (2003).
473. Id. at 176, 585 S.E.2d at 597.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 448, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)). For additional discussion of these recent develop-
ments, see Shepherd, supra note 137, at 247-48.
477. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 738, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
478. Id.
479. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-290(A) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
480. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 937, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-270(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
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mandatory jail time for certain repeat offenders.481 A DUI defen-
dant previously convicted of three DUI offenses within five years
is now presumed ineligible for bail.482 The stringent requirements
of that section, however, will render its application infrequent.
Defendants convicted of DUI who registered a blood-alcohol level
of 0.15 or above are now required to use an ignition interlock de-
vice, which prevents a car from starting until the driver's breath
is tested.483 A driver who has a suspended, revoked, or restricted
license for DUI and is driving with a 0.02 blood alcohol level or
above is now guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.4 4
The court may now order a defendant, as a part of his restitu-
tion, to reimburse a locality up to $1,000 for rescue and fire-
fighting services provided in a DUI incident.488 A defendant who
fails to pay these costs will see his driver's license suspended and
his vehicle registration cancelled.4 6 The driver of a car "solely
owned and operated by the accused during the commission of a
felony" DUI faces the possibility that the car will be forfeited.487
Family members, however, can petition the court to keep the car
if the forfeiture will result in a substantial hardship.4 8
Drivers who meet the blood-alcohol criteria and who are
charged with a second or subsequent DUI offense will have their
driver's license administratively suspended for sixty days. 9 For a
third charge, the license is suspended until trial.49 °
The General Assembly has also authorized law-enforcement of-
ficers to arrest, without a warrant and in any place, intoxicated
drivers who caused an accident, provided that the arrest is made
with probable cause and within three hours of the accident.49'
481. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
482. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(B)(9) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
483. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
484. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-272(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004). Since driving on a suspended or
revoked license is presently a Class 1 misdemeanor, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391(D) (Repl.
Vol. 2004), as a practical matter, the chief effect of the new law is to prohibit those with
restricted licenses from driving after drinking even small amounts of alcohol.
485. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1716(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
486. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-417(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
487. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270(C)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
488. Id.
489. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
490. Id.
491. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 949, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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A driver convicted of unreasonable refusal within ten years of a
prior conviction for either DUI or unreasonable refusal is now
guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.49 2 A conviction for an unreason-
able refusal after two prior convictions for DUI or unreasonable
refusal constitutes a Class 1 misdemeanor.493 The legislature also
eliminated the requirement that a magistrate advise a suspect of
the law regarding the refusal to take a blood test.494
Finally, the General Assembly limited the applicability of Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-294.1, which addresses a situation where
a driver is charged with both reckless driving and DUI "growing
out of the same act or acts."495 Once a driver is convicted of one of
the charges, the other charge must be dismissed.496 In practice,
the provision provides an incentive for drivers charged with both
DUI and reckless driving to plead guilty to reckless driving at the
earliest opportunity so as to obtain the dismissal of the DUI
charge. The General Assembly limited the scope of this provision
by limiting the term "reckless driving" to "reckless driving in vio-
lation of § 46.2-852" or any ordinance "incorporating § 46.2-
852.",41 Virginia Code section 46.2-852 prohibits driving a vehicle
on any highway "recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to
endanger the life, limb, or property of any person. 498 Therefore,
other violations termed "reckless driving" are now excluded from
section 19.2-294.1. 499
ANN. § 19.2-81(7) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
492. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
493. Id. § 18.2-268.4(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
494. Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 1022, 2004 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-268.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)). The same amendment also eliminates the provi-
sion that the declaration of refusal or the certificate of the magistrate at a medical facility
constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant refused to allow a blood or breath
sample to be taken. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3(C) (Repl. Vol.
2004)).
495. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 937, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-294.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
496. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
497. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 937, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-294.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
498. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-852 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
499. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-829, 46.2-862 to -869 (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp.
2004).
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C. Firearms
Anyone who is not a citizen and who is illegally present in the
United States is now prohibited from possessing or transporting a
firearm in Virginia. °° A violation of this statute constitutes a
Class 6 felony.5 ' The General Assembly has also forbidden, as a
Class 1 misdemeanor, the possession of firearms, certain gun
parts, and other dangerous weapons in the Commonwealth's air-
port terminals. 52
D. Fetal Homicide
The General Assembly enacted a new statute that punishes to
the same extent as murder the unlawful, willful, deliberate, and
malicious killing of a fetus.0 3 When such killings are premedi-
tated, they are punishable as first-degree murder, otherwise they
are punishable as second-degree murder.50 4
E. Gang Legislation
Given the rising prominence of gang violence, it is not surpris-
ing that the General Assembly should address this issue. This
year, the General Assembly streamlined the definition of a gang;
to establish the existence of a gang, the prosecution need not
prove a "pattern of criminal gang activity."0 5 Instead, the gov-
ernment must establish two or more violations of predicate
criminal acts, one of which must be an act of violence.50 6 The list
of predicates is now longer, with drug and property crimes sup-
plementing the existing predicates.0 7 The legislature added gang
500. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
501. Id.
502. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 894, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-287.01 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
503. Act of May 12, 2004, ch. 1026, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
504. Id. See also Shepherd, supra note 137, at 277.
505. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 396, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)). For a discussion of Virginia's recent gang legislation in
the juvenile law context, see Shepherd, supra note 137, at 270.
506. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
507. Id.
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crimes to the list of offenses under which the accused is presumed
ineligible for bail.5"' Furthermore, probation officers must now in-
clude in their presentence reports information concerning the de-
fendant's membership or participation in a gang.50 9
The General Assembly increased penalties for adults who re-
cruit gang members, eliminated the requirement that recruits
must be juveniles, and added an enhanced penalty for repeat of-
fenders.510 An obstruction of justice charge connected with a gang
crime will result in an enhanced penalty.51' The General Assem-
bly also authorized the civil forfeiture of assets for gang-related
crimes.512 Multijurisdictional grand juries are now authorized to
investigate gang crimes.513 Finally, the wiretap statute was
amended to permit the Attorney General to apply for a wiretap
order to investigate crimes committed by gangs and mobs.514
F. Mandatory Minimums
After July 1, 2004, anywhere the term "mandatory minimum"
appears in the Virginia Code, the court must impose the "entire
term of confinement, the full amount of the fine and the complete
requirement of community service prescribed by law."515 "The
court shall not suspend in full or in part any punishment de-
scribed as mandatory minimum punishment. 
516
G. Misdemeanor Discovery in Circuit Court
A defendant appealing from general district court to circuit
court can now obtain discovery under Virginia Supreme Court
508. Acts of Mar. 31, 2004, ch. 308, 2004 Va. Acts - and Apr. 14, 2004, ch. 819, 2004
Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(D)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
509. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
510. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 396, 2004 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-46.3, -46.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
511. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
512. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 396, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-46.3:2 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
513. VA. CODE ANN. § 19 .2 -215.1(1)(q) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
514. Act of Mar. 15, 2004, ch. 122, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-66 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
515. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-12.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
516. Id.
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Rule 7C:5.517 Such discovery was previously unavailable for mis-
demeanor appeals to circuit court.518
H. State RICO
Virginia prosecutors are now equipped with a version of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).51 9
Unlike its federal analogue, the Virginia legislation does not con-
tain a civil component. 2 ° The law details a list of predicate crimes
and provides that a violation of two or more of these crimes con-
stitutes criminal "racketeering activity." '521 The predicate crimes
include any offenses involving obstruction of justice or criminal
street gangs, as well as certain enumerated felonies. 522 The law
prohibits the receipt by any person or entity of "any proceeds
known to have been derived directly from racketeering activ-
ity." 23 Furthermore, the law criminalizes the transmission of
money knowingly derived from or traceable to racketeering activ-
ity.524 In addition to severe criminal penalties, the RICO statute
contains asset forfeiture provisions.525 The law also permits a
court to order the persons or entities involved in racketeering ac-
tivity to divest themselves of tainted property or to order the dis-
solution or reorganization of tainted enterprises. 6
I. Writs of Actual Innocence
In a significant departure from Virginia's rules governing the
finality of criminal convictions, convicted felons will now be able
to seek a writ of actual innocence for nonbiological evidence. 27
517. Id. § 19.2-265.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004); see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 7C:5 (Repl. Vol.
2004).
518. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 348, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-265.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
519. Acts of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 883, 2004 Va. Acts - and Apr. 21, 2004, ch. 996, 2004
Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-512 to -516 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
520. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
521. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-513 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
522. Id.
523. Id. § 18.2-514 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
524. Id. § 18.2-516 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
525. Id. § 18.2-515(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
526. Id. § 18.2-514(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
527. Id. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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The law applies only to convicted felons who pled not guilty and
permits only one such challenge. 2 ' The writ must be filed in the
Court of Appeals of Virginia.529 The court will examine the record
and direct a response from the Attorney General if necessary. 3 ' If
a petition is not summarily dismissed, the petitioner will be enti-
tled to counsel.531 There is no statute of limitations for seeking the
writ.532
The standard for a writ of actual innocence is a rigorous one;
the petitioner must allege, inter alia, that the newly discovered
evidence was not previously known and is not cumulative.533 A
petitioner must establish that "no rational trier of fact could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."534 The petitioner
must also attach all relevant documents, including affidavits and
test results.535
The Attorney General can proffer evidence that was not ad-
duced at trial, including evidence that was suppressed. 36 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia may order an evidentiary hearing,
which is to be held in the circuit court where the case was origi-
nally tried.537
At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the petitioner, who
must establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that "no ra-
tional trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."5 3' Following the hearing, the trial court must
make factual findings and file these findings with the court of ap-
peals.5 39 A petitioner who meets this burden of proof will have his
conviction vacated.54 ° If the evidence shows, however, that the pe-
titioner is nevertheless guilty of a lesser-included offense, the
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. § 19.2-327.12 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
531. Id. § 19.2-327.11(E) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
532. See id. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
533. Id. § 19.2-327.11(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
534. Id. § 19.2-327.1 l(A)(vii) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
535. Id. § 19.2-327.11(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
536. Id. § 19.2-327.11(C) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
537. Id. § 19.2-327.12 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
538. Id. § 19.2-327.13 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
539. Id. § 19.2-327.12 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
540. Id. § 19.2-327.13 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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court will remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.54' Fi-
nally, the losing party may appeal to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. 5 4
2
J. Appointment of Counsel Before Detention Hearing
The General Assembly provided for the appointment of counsel
before a juvenile's detention hearing, unless an attorney is re-
tained and enters an appearance on the child's behalf.
543
541. Id.
542. Id. § 19.2-327.10 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
543. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 437, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-266(B) (Cum. Supp. 2004)). See also Shepherd, supra note 137.
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